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Cooperation or resistance?  Representing workers’ health and safety in a hazardous 
industry 
 
Abstract 
 
This study considers the actions of worker health and safety representatives in coalmines in 
Queensland, where there is little evidence of the facilitating role of management previous 
studies have associated with the successful operation of worker representation in 
occupational health and safety. It examines how worker representatives deliver their pluralist 
representational role in a context characterised by essentially unitary thinking amongst their 
employers; and the effectiveness of the strategies they use.  
 
Introduction 
 
In most advanced market economies statutory arrangements for workers’ representation and 
consultation on occupational health and safety (OHS) were implemented during the last three 
decades of the 20th century. These provisions governed the selection, rights and functions of 
workers’ representatives, facilities employers were to afford them, and their part in risk 
assessment and OHS management (OHSM) procedures. Subsequent research on worker 
representation suggests this essentially pluralist approach, when implemented with adequate 
support, is likely to result in improved OHS outcomes (Nichols and Walters 2009).  
 
The introduction of these statutory measures coincided with a period of economic and 
political development — the so-called ‘golden years’ of the post-war compromise — when 
preconditions necessary for its successful operation were at their zenith. Times have changed. 
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The political economy in which these arrangements for workers’ OHS are situated has altered 
fundamentally. Consequently, some of their institutional supports have eroded. Employers 
and many OHS practitioners have embraced a different approach to worker engagement in 
which there is limited room for autonomous representation of workers’ interests in OHS. 
These more unitary approaches emphasise individual worker engagement with corporate 
values and organisational culture, and assume an identity of interest between workers and 
managers in improving OHS performance. Improvements are largely operationalized through 
the application of management systems orientated towards behaviour modification, 
individual accountability and monitoring.  
 
Others who have examined participative approaches to OHSM in mining have argued that 
one reason for the limitations in its contribution to improving trends in OHS recently are the 
hostile labour relations in the industry — which they suggest lead to mistrust between 
managers and union representatives (Gunningham and Sinclair 2012). They conclude this 
undermines participative engagement, and this in turn stalls progress on OHS. However, this 
interpretation assumes the existence of common interests in health and safety shared between 
workers and their employers, fails to take into account the historical, pluralist basis of the 
relevant regulations, and also fails to acknowledge wider and equally long-standing reasons 
for the hostile labour relations that characterise the mining industry.  
 
The core interest of this paper therefore concerns what happens when workers seek to 
represent their OHS interests where the regulatory ideal is undermined both by poor labour 
relations and managerial aspirations to pursue a unitarist approach. To do this, we have 
examined the role and activities of union OHS representatives in coalmines in Queensland, 
Australia.   
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Participation in a cold climate — conflicting models and limited outcomes?  
 
In many countries, statutory measures provide workers and their organisations with rights to 
appoint/elect representatives and support their OHS functions within their workplace, 
including rights to be consulted, participate in joint health and safety committees, receive 
information, inspect workplaces, accidents and incidents, and to receive training and time to 
undertake these tasks. Representatives often have rights to accompany regulatory inspectors 
during visits and receive information from them. Details vary by country, sector and 
establishment size. Similar provisions are outlined in supra-national measures such as ILO 
Convention 155 and the EU Framework Directive 89/391. 
 
Studies have found these participatory arrangements are associated with improved OHSM 
practices and these findings generally hold for both direct performance indicators, such as 
injury or illness rates, as well as indirect measures, like OHSM practices (see for example 
Yassi et al 2013; Walters and Nichols 2007). A recent UK study concluded (Robinson and 
Smallman, 2013:689):  
 
The empirical modelling of workplace injuries also reveals that representative 
participation matters. Participation is associated with lower levels of injuries and 
conversely, non-participation is associated with a higher incidence of injuries. 
This adds to the empirical literature on institutional arrangements by linking 
union effectiveness to the level and access to participation they enjoy vis-a-vis 
management. Specifically this perspective reveals that some participation is 
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better than none, higher is better than lower and that the alignment of voice 
between management and unions is fundamental to success. 
 
In sum, the weight of evidence indicates better outcomes are likely when employers manage 
OHS with representative worker participation and that joint arrangements, trade unions and 
worker representation at the workplace are positively associated with such outcomes. 
However, to be effective this representation requires a set of preconditions to support its 
implementation, central among which is the facilitating support of management (Walters and 
Nichols 2006; Nichols and Walters, 2009). 
 
Studies in several countries indicate both representatives and managers base their ideas about 
how participation should occur on statutory requirements (Nichols and Walters 2009). While 
labour inspectors generally prefer an advisory rather than enforcement approach to 
monitoring statutory measures, both managers and representatives perceive inspectors’ 
engagement as a strong support for effective participative arrangements (Walters et al, 2012). 
Qualitative studies frequently point to the importance of training in making representatives 
more effective and a correlation between the activities in which trade union health and safety 
representatives (HSRs) are engaged and their experience of training (Warren-Langford et al, 
1993; Walters et al, 2001). Union support for HSRs is another facilitating factor cited in 
many studies.  
 
But it is the facilitating effect of senior managerial commitment to participative approaches to 
OHS arrangements that research generally finds to be most critical to their success. This 
finding applies irrespective of whether the studies examined the operation of joint OHS 
committees; dialogue between middle managers/supervisors and representatives; or 
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representative involvement in inspections, investigations, receiving information, reviewing 
safety systems, raising complaints, or receiving training, time off and facilities to do these 
things (Walters et al 2012).  
 
This finding should not be surprising. Participative approaches to OHSM were embedded in 
OHS regulation in most advanced market economies from the 1970s. The shift to ‘regulated 
self-regulation’ (or ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, ch 4)) at national 
and supranational level (such as in the EU Framework Directive 89/391 and ILO Convention 
155) included requirements for worker representation and consultation as an integral part of 
more systematic approaches to managing OHS risks (see Frick et al eds. 2000). In the 
systematic management of OHS, arrangements for representative participation help drive a 
statutory ‘prevention triangle’, argued to be the basis for its effectiveness (see, for example, 
Dawson et al, 1988). Its three vertices comprise: competent employer engagement, with 
responsibility for evaluating and controlling risks; worker representation contributing 
practical knowhow and monitoring management functions; and state regulation and 
inspection. In this triangle employers occupy pole position, with arrangements for worker 
representation being dependent on the co-operation of managers; and regulatory inspection 
offering general guidance, occasionally with a more formal response to non-compliance (see 
for example Bruhn 2006; Quinlan et al 2009).  
 
However, this model of regulated self-regulation is far from universally applied. Extensive 
research indicates it is seldom found in smaller firms that constitute the vast majority of 
enterprises. Even amongst larger organisations, approaches to OHS management include 
those where worker representation arrangements are reduced, or absent, often because unions 
have insufficient presence or power to require them. In these situations, despite regulatory 
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provisions, worker participation in systematic OHSM may amount to little more than 
following behaviour-based rules set by management (Frick and Kempa 2011).  
 
Behaviour-based safety (BBS) approaches to managing OHS are widely favoured by 
corporate interests and increasingly attract substantial support from OHS 
professionals/practitioners as well as regulatory agencies, although evidence for their success 
is mixed (Dalrymple et al, 1998; Frick et al, 2000; Hopkins, 2000, 2005a, b). Frick and 
Kempa (2011) summarise concerns with this approach: 
 
The prevention described more often revolves around control of ‘safe’ procedures 
than the prescribed upstream prevention of eliminating risks at the design stage. And 
the worker participation described in these examples is more a top down 
communication on why and how to obey management safety procedures than a 
genuine dialogue between management and workers on ends and means in a MS 
[Management System] which aims to reduce occupational risk. 
 
Where ‘worker engagement’ is viewed by management as compliance with corporate rules, 
the preconditions for effective worker representation according to pluralist regulatory models 
are often undermined. Further, the scope for employers to dictate conditions at work in neo-
liberal political economies has facilitated the proliferation of more unitary systems, where 
behaviour-based management has substituted for systems for autonomous worker 
representation even though regulatory frameworks supporting the latter largely remain in 
place (Quinlan, 2014). 
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These changes beg a number of questions concerning the continued relevance of the statutory 
arrangements for worker participation, as well as how workers’ representatives and unions 
respond to the challenges of unitary systems.  
 
Where the preconditions don’t apply — coalmining in Queensland 
 
Mining is a hazardous industry with a high incidence of fatal injury. Queensland is one of 
two Australian states where coal is mined extensively. With around 40 mines (both open-cast 
and underground), Queensland is a major coal producer and exporter. Notwithstanding 
improvements, mining remains one of four sectors with the highest incidence of fatal injuries 
(Quinlan 2014; Safe Work Australia, 2013).  
 
Queensland mines include strong representation of large corporations with extensive global 
mining interests and corporate OHSM strategies. Labour relations are contentious. 
Ccoalmining companies employ aggressive and often uncompromising human resource 
strategies, attempting, among other things, to marginalise the position of organised labour. At 
the same time, miners are comparatively highly organised and the position of the miners’ 
trade union is significantly embedded not only in the mines but in the mining communities in 
which they are situated. Aided by wider reforms in the systems for Australian industrial 
relations, during the 1990s mining companies were able to establish increased managerial 
control over work regimes and increase the use of contractors and non-union contract labour 
as well as to some extent disconnect them from the social communities of the miners they 
employed (Bowden and Barry 2015; Waring, 2003).  Nevertheless, although mines are 
frequently situated some distance from communities, they are not entirely remote, so drive-in 
drive-out arrangements are common. Corporate organisational strategies also encourage 
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considerable movement among senior mine managers, resulting in regular turnover amongst 
managers responsible for OHS.  
 
Australia has a federal system of government where the power to regulate OHS is vested in 
state jurisdictions. In Queensland, coalmining safety regulation shifted to process-based 
measures with the introduction of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. Reductions 
in coalmining injuries and fatalities occurred around this time, which have been favourably 
compared internationally (Yang, 2012) and linked to these regulatory changes (Gunningham 
and Sinclair 2012: ch 2).1 Characteristic of Queensland mining regulation is the link made 
between these systematic approaches to OHS risk management and representative worker 
participation (though the latter long predates the former). Statutory provisions give workers 
the right to elect two Site Safety and Health Representatives (SSHRs) per minr and the 
miners’ union (the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU)) to appoint 
three Industry Safety and Health Representatives (ISHRs). ISHRs must be qualified mine 
deputies and their remit (including rights of access) extends to all Queensland mines. The 
rights of both types of representatives include the usual HSR functions of inspection, 
consultation and representation. They also have powers to review mines’ OHSM systems, 
stop processes they consider dangerous and stop production altogether if necessary. The 
statutory provisions also limit the activities of representatives to OHS (as opposed to 
industrial relations) issues and emphasise their activities should not impede production. As 
coalmining is highly unionised, in practice the vast majority of SSHRs have always been 
union representatives.  
 
                                                        
1 State-based, Australian general OHS legislation has largely been harmonised under a Model Act since 
2011 but efforts to harmonise mine safety legislation have stalled.  
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The study upon which this paper draws examined the role and effectiveness of both types of 
representatives in addressing OHS on behalf of their constituencies; their relations with these 
constituencies and with mine managers (Walters et al 2014). This paper focuses on evidence 
of the ways worker representatives operate in situations where labour relations are 
unsupportive of a co-operative approach and where employers’ preferred OHSM systems 
generally operate to marginalise representative.  
 
Methods 
 
The study’s research methods linked analysis of documentary evidence of mine safety 
representative activities in Queensland (i.e. SSHRs and ISHRs) with interviews with 
representatives. Analysis of ISHRs and SSHRs’ inspection records, as well as those of 
government mines inspectors (from the Queensland Government Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines), was undertaken in relation to approximately half (19) of Queensland’s 
coalmines. These reports covered 1998 to 2013 (although a small number were from an 
earlier period). Inspection records must be maintained by law and were made available to 
researchers by the CFMEU. Twelve of the mines were  open-cut and seven were 
underground. Most were large or medium-sized (nine open-cut and eight underground mines 
respectively). Union density was greater than 75% in the majority of the mines included in 
the study. In four mines, one third to half the miners were union members, while in three 
there was no significant union presence. 
 
For the documentary analysis each report was scrutinised to identify why an inspection had 
taken place, what was inspected and the outcome. Information concerning representatives’ 
functions under the Act (such as issuing notices, stopping work or reviewing OHS 
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management procedures), as well as other relevant background details, were also recorded. 
Particular attention was paid to inspection of ‘fatal risks’. In mining the nature of fatal risks is 
well-known and documented (Saleh and Cummings, 2011; Walters et al 2014; Quinlan 
2014). The aim of our documentary analysis was to examine representatives’ activities and 
particularly the extent to which they addressed serious risks and OHSM systems. The 
intention was to build a detailed picture of representatives’ role in preventing or ameliorating 
work-related ill-health, injury and death.  
 
Further details on representatives’ activities were obtained from interviews with a sample of 
18 SSHRs, 14 employed in mines where inspection reports had been analysed and 4 from 
other mines. In addition, five ISHRs (three current and two who had held the position during 
the time covered by the reports) were interviewed, along with a senior Queensland 
Government mines inspector. We also observed sessions conducted by ISHRs at the annual 
CFMEU-organised training event for SSHRs. Two senior national CFMEU officials were 
also interviewed, but no representatives of employers/management agreed to participate. As 
well as investigating their activities, interviews sought to understand how representatives 
construed OHS issues on which they could legitimately represent miners’ interests, how they 
perceived the boundaries between such issues and labour relations matters, and the strategies 
they adopted for resolving any conflicts. Interviews were undertaken in two union offices in 
Queensland and during training event. Interviews took 1-1.5 hours, were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed and analysed in relation to the above themes.  
 
Representing workers’ interests on health and safety in a climate of hostile labour 
relations — A success despite the odds?  
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We focused on four main aspects of the nature and role of the HSRs in our study:  
 
 Who the representatives were and their commitment to their role.  
 What kinds of risks they addressed and how they did so.  
 The support they received from managers, inspectors and workers.  
 The use made of their statutory powers of intervention.  
 
We reasoned that taking this approach would allow an exploration of representatives’ 
motivations and how they framed their role within the wider labour relations contexts in 
which they operated. It would enable an analysis of the risks they addressed to help 
determine whether these were serious health and safety matters or whether representatives 
were using their position to pursue other labour relations issues as is sometimes claimed. It 
would further enable a consideration of the level of support they received in carrying out their 
activities on OHS and in this respect it would especially allow an exploration of how 
representatives positioned themselves in relation to co-operation or conflict with their 
employers/managers. Finally, it allowed us to examine the ways in which they used their 
statutory powers, especially those enabling them to stop work in scenarios they deemed to be 
unsafe where such actions might be against the wishes of their employers/managers.  Focus 
on these issues therefore enabled an exploration of how, and with what effects, pluralist or 
even conflict orientated strategies for worker representation functioned in an environment 
driven by unitary corporate notions of participation/engagement in OHS issues.  
 
The representatives 
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The representatives were experienced miners, most with both underground and open-cut 
experience. Most SSHRs had been in post for several years or considerably longer and had 
not held other union positions. Prior to becoming representatives some had undertaken OHS-
related roles like being members of emergency rescue teams. A strong sense of purposeful 
dedication to representing fellow workers emerged from interviews with both SSHRs and 
ISHRs. For example, explaining why he moved from mines rescue to take on the role, one 
SSHR said:  
 
I basically thought we can improve things…’cos we’re reactive as rescue. We turn up 
and fix the situation somebody had a broken leg, a heart attack or an injury of some 
sort. And I thought…we’ll look at doing something better and helping people out 
before they get hurt.  
(7120040 - SSHR)  
 
Commitment to coping with the demands of the role was also evident among SSHRs. Many 
talked about how representative activities frequently extended into their lives outside work. 
This sense of dedication was even more evident in the responses of ISHRs who all had 
considerable experience of both coalmining and OHS representation: 
 
…its a huge drop in wages. And you’ve just doubled your hours of work to do the 
role!…You do it for the love and passion. And you might get weekends off every 
sixth weekend, ‘cos you’re on call.  
(71200033 — former ISHR)  
 
The risks  
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What takes up so much of representatives’ time? Do they use their functions and powers 
responsibly and commensurate with the risks addressed? To address these questions we first 
analysed documentary records of their activities in relation to Quinlan’s (2014) classification 
of fatal risks. Based on an extensive review of the literature, this classification presents a 
typology of the common risks of injury or death resulting from coalmining incidents 
according to their seriousness, with those that commonly result in fatalities ranked as the 
most serious. Almost all the reports (94%) of the inspections undertaken by the 
representatives concerned the inspection of at least one such fatal risk. Moreover, although 
there were some differences in the risk types inspected, there was little difference between 
representatives and regulatory inspectors in the high proportion of their reports concerning 
such risks (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1  
Inspection of Fatal risks 
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With regard to documentary records of serious incidents, we found many of the incidents that were 
reported to the representatives, and the subsequent investigations they reviewed, were classified as 
High Potential Incidents (HPIs).. The legislation defines a HPI as ‘an event, or a series of events, that 
causes or has the potential to cause a significant adverse effect on the safety or health of a person’ — 
thus such incidents usually fit among Quinlan’s (2104) fatal risks. Mines are required to report HPIs 
to SSHRs, ISHRs and the mines Inspectorate. Many ISHR reports referring to HPIs were written 
following such notification and show ISHRs’ involvement in and support for the investigation and 
subsequent learning processes. 
 
Both types of representatives were also informed of serious accidents and reviewed the subsequent 
company investigation reports. In total 16% of the ISHR and SSHR reports we analysed referred to 
representatives assisting with investigations into serious accidents or HPIs, and all of them referred 
to at least one of the more serious risks included in Quinlan’s category of fatal risks. Again this 
activity is empowered by the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. 
 
From the interviews it became clear that representatives’ main concern was to ensure investigations 
were rigorous and addressed underlying causes, consistent with robust OHSM systems and 
regulation. Overall, ISHRs were more concerned with the wider implications of the incident and 
investigation process, while SSHRs were more focused on preventing a recurrence. Although ISHRs 
were sometimes involved in investigation of these incidents, more typically they undertook an 
oversight/monitoring role: 
 
…they ring up…this is what’s occurred, okay, you may ask a few questions: what have you 
done to stop it from reoccurring, how bad is the injury, where has he gone to hospital, that 
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sort of stuff, then at some stage they have to send a form, 1A it’s called, they send it to the 
inspectors and to us. 
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
SSHRs were commonly kept informed of investigations undertaken, with more significant 
involvement depending on management: 
 
…depends who the management are. If there is…like a major incident, then sometimes we go 
and investigate it as well but it depends who it is. Sometimes we don’t get invited and 
sometimes we don’t get told about it.  
(7120013 - SSHR)  
 
Investigating incidents in which injuries or fatalities had occurred, for which legal responsibilities 
may apply for the company, sometimes led to perceptions of a conflict of interest with the senior 
managers responsible for OHS (site senior executives (SSEs)). Representatives commented on 
difficulties performing their roles in such situations: 
 
SSEs have got their different ways. Some are good, because I’ve been involved in, what four 
deaths, on a mine site…Three of them it was good, the fourth one was…you’re not allowed 
there, don’t do this, don’t do that…I’ve done what, three investigations courses with the 
police. So in other words I know what I’m doing when I go on to a scene. But they don’t 
want that. They just do their own thing because they think we’re going to blame them. 
(7120020 - SSHR) 
  
Supporting and facilitating consultation 
 16 
 
In some mines senior management was perceived to give ‘reasonable help’ to a SSHR ‘in carrying 
out the representative’s functions’ as required under section 99 of the 1999 Act. However, in many 
others acceptance of their role by management was seen as the outcome of a hard-won struggle.  
Parallel BBS systems were not helpful. Representatives reported having limited facilities; problems 
securing reasonable time to undertake investigations and inspections; poor responsiveness from 
managers to remedying issues; and general hostility to their role. Similarly, while some had positive 
experiences in reviewing OHSM systems and procedures, others reported a lack of consultation and 
managers choosing other workers for consultation on procedures, thereby marginalising 
representatives: 
 
….you sometimes find that the company will select people to do those risk analysis and 
they’re not always people on the job, fully relevant to what’s going on. 
(7120035 – SSHR) 
 
ISHRs also spoke about the range of managerial attitudes experienced by SSHRs and how this 
affected the support they were able to offer. They frequently gauged their approach to helping 
SSHRs to match the responsiveness of particular mines’ management, going to some lengths to 
persuade them of the value of greater consultation with SSHRs. Many of these situations reflected 
the emphasis on BBS and its focus on direct engagement with individual workers, where it was 
difficult for worker representatives to gain a purchase in participative approaches to OHS, obliging 
them to be reactive in defending workers’ interests in the face of poor OHSM. They acted from 
outside a management system from which managers had effectively excluded them.  
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Interviews with representatives also highlighted the considerable time taken up with reactive 
responses to complaints from miners. Asked how often matters were raised one respondent stated: 
 
Every day, every day. They have a doubt every day. They might come up and say look, has 
there been a risk assessment done on this? And I will say look I wasn’t involved in it but I 
will find out and get back to you…every day, without a doubt.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
However, it was clear that the boundaries between reactive and proactive work were blurred: one 
often led to the other.  
 
There was evidence that raising issues with SSHRs also occurred outside the workplace:  
 
I don’t finish work when everyone else finishes work, I go home, I have a meal at night, you 
go and sit down for dinner, I get three, four people sometimes, I’ve had them stand in line, to 
talk to me. They all come to me with an issue, this happened today, this. I say well…talk to 
your supervisor, yes I did, but that supervisor doesn’t want to know about it, alright, well 
leave it to me…I’ll go and have a talk to the supervisor, get him away, say listen, yesterday 
this happened, how and why did that happen, did anybody mention anything to you, …, so I 
can have a talk to them, I can sort it out that way. 
(7120025 - SSHR) 
 
As the quote illustrates, approaches outside working hours reflected the number of issues 
representatives addressed and/or the affected worker feeling that manager matter had not been 
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properly dealt with. Other complaints came to SSHRs outside work time and off-site because 
workers were afraid of the repercussions:  
 
…you’ve got this massive culture of people that are scared or intimidated to raise 
concerns…Contractors and permanents as well. There’s the culture if you speak up…you’ll 
be given crap jobs or you know, you’ll be put in the corner…a lot of people are intimidated to 
speak up, and that’s the culture that [company] has created.  
(7120022 - SSHR) 
 
This quote further illustrates the pervasive effects of individualised behavioural approaches to safety 
management, which contribute to feelings of insecurity and mistrust in managers, especially among 
workers in already insecure work arrangements (see Gunningham and Sinclair 2102: ch 4).  
 
While representatives’ views about the support they received from managers were mixed at best, the 
vast majority felt they received strong support from fellow miners. This was often implicit in how 
they described investigating complaints or making representations on behalf of miners. It also 
manifested in fellow miner confidence in their decision-making during confrontations with 
management: 
 
…they were told to go back to work and they refused to go back until I gave them direction. 
That sits very highly in my book, that they had management telling them to do something and 
they wouldn’t do it. They were waiting for my instruction. That tells me that they believe in 
what I am doing.  
(7120021 - SSHR)  
 
 19 
Relations with the mines inspectorate were somewhat more equivocal. According to the senior mines 
inspector interviewed: 
 
What should happen is that the SSHR should be able to accompany the Inspector on his 
inspection.  
(7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector) 
 
But in over half of the reports of inspections undertaken between 2009 and 2013, there was no 
mention of whether a SSHR had been present., This is an improvement over earlier years but the 
most likely inference is that SSHRs remain excluded from a substantial proportion of mines 
inspectors’ visits (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 
Reference to SSHR presence during inspectorate mine visits over time 
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the inspector during the inspection. Others felt their managers were less forthcoming with this 
information. It was also felt that the likelihood of SSHRs meeting inspectors was influenced by 
inspectors’ attitudes:  
 
Depends on the inspector. Some inspectors are pretty proactive about that and some aren’t.  
(7120034 - ISHR) 
  
Inspectors are often mining engineers who have previously worked as managers. This, and the 
practice of some individuals moving back and forth between positions in the industry and the 
inspectorate, led representatives to question their impartiality: a concern recognised by the senior 
mines inspector interviewed. Despite this, there was considerable mutual respect for the roles each 
played in OHS surveillance.  
 
Using statutory intervention powers 
 
The most disputed statutory provisions for SSHRs and ISHRs are the capacity to suspend work 
where there is a serious risk of injury or ill-health. The Coal Mine Safety and Health Act 1999 gives 
SSHRs authority to order suspension of all mining operations, stop specific operations, or require 
supervisors to stop them, if they reasonably believe there is an immediate danger. Similar powers are 
given to ISHRs as powers to issue a directive under section 167. Representatives also have statutory 
powers to order management to undertake certain actions. For example, they must advise the SSE if 
they believe the OHSM system to be inadequate and inform a mines inspector if they are not 
satisfied this advice has been appropriately addressed. The mines inspector is obliged to investigate 
and report this in the mines record.  
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In a hostile labour relations climate, where representatives felt they received limited support, it might 
be anticipated they would often have recourse to these statutory powers. We examined the 
documentary evidence and questioned representatives concerning their use. Analysis of the former 
showed that ISHRs rarely stopped work: only 5% of reports in our sample referred to suspension of 
operations.  
 
Suspension of the entire mine operation, as opposed to operations in particular areas or using specific 
equipment, was even rarer: there were only six such suspensions in the records we analysed (1% of 
all ISHR reports). All but one referred to fatal risks as the reason for stopping work. Notably, two 
reports referred explicitly to the ISHR supporting an earlier decision by the SSHR to suspend 
operations. Similarly, only three SSHR reports referred to suspending operations, all concerned fatal 
risks and all were from the same mine.  
 
The CFMEU’s own analysis of suspension notices for all Queensland coalmines identifies 80 served 
since the 1999 Act was introduced (CFMEU, 2013). Our data were less complete, but the percentage 
of suspension notices identified was broadly what would be anticipated from the CFMEU data.  
 
There were too few suspension directives in our data to draw reliable inferences concerning patterns 
or trends over time. However, the CFMEU (2013) analysis, of all Directives issued since the 1999 
Act, indicated they have been increasingly used at the management systems level. It noted that until 
recently mining company objections to the directives were rare. Even when appeals were lodged, the 
actions of ISHRs have been upheld, or the Mines Inspectorate has issued a Directive under section 
166 in their place, which requires remedial action but allows the process in question to continue 
while such action is taken. The CFMEU pointed out that had the ISHRs had the power to issue a 
section 166 Directive, they would have done so themselves in these cases.  
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In addition to suspension orders, other formal notifications by ISHRs were also rare (8%). Again, 
some (11%) were explicitly supportive of prior actions by the SSHR. Many identified weaknesses 
and required corrections to OHSM systems (for a more detailed analysis see Walters et al 2014:67-
77). 
 
Several relevant points emerge from this documentary evidence. First, orders made by the ISHRs in 
relation to inadequate OHSM systems represent a very small proportion of their activities. Second, 
orders have been used to address significant risks, including inadequacies in emergency response 
procedures and equipment, ventilation, gas monitoring, machinery hazards etc. Further, they are 
generally used to identify the link between particular risks and deficiencies in the OHSM system 
responsible for controlling those risks. This feedback constitutes a procedure widely accepted as 
good practice in OHSM and risk prevention. Therefore, documentary evidence supports the 
conclusion that representatives use their powers to suspend work responsibly. They also act 
appropriately in relation to identifying serious failings in OHSM systems. Finally, there was no 
evidence that referral of these matters to Mines Inspectors resulted in representatives being deemed 
to have issued orders inappropriately or irresponsibly.  
 
Interviews reinforced evidence that both ISHRs and SSHRs were cognizant of the significance of 
their powers to stop work and used them sparingly:  
 
 …we’re pretty careful how we issue a 167…it’s your final power.  
(7120037 - ISHR) 
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Generally, they used these powers only when they felt there was no other recourse after engagement 
with management had failed to reduce the seriousness of the risk concerned:  
 
…in the whole 8 years I am happy to say I have only had to do it about 4 times. But a lot of 
times, if something is not an immediate danger then I will try and give people the opportunity 
to fix it.  
(7120013 - SSHR)  
 
On other occasions representatives used suspension orders when they perceived an immediate risk of 
serious harm if the process or operation continued:  
 
I issued a 167, get everyone out of the mine. And that was warranted…on that occasion, 
because I wanted everyone out the mine, out of the explosive range then we’ll have the 
discussion.  
(7120038/9 – Former ISHR)  
 
Both SSHRs and ISHRs were aware of the strictures placed on their freedom to serve such notices 
and regulatory requirements on them not to ‘perform a function or exercise a power…for a purpose 
other than a safety or health purpose’ or ‘unnecessarily impede production at a coalmine’. At the 
same time, possessing such powers considerably strengthened perceptions of their legitimacy 
amongst colleagues and bolstered their confidence they would be taken seriously by senior 
managers. These findings parallel those in studies of the powers of HSRs to stop dangerous work in 
other industries and countries. For example, in Sweden researchers found these powers were used 
very sparingly but were greatly valued by representatives for the legitimacy and respect for their role 
they conferred (Frick, 2009). Similarly, Australia an ACTU (2005) survey of HSRs found 11% had 
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issued a provisional improvement notice (PIN) or default notice and 91% of these said it was 
effective in resolving the OHS issue. There is also little Australian evidence that powers to stop 
dangerous work have been overused. The ACTU (2005) survey reported that 21% of HRSs reported 
directing that unsafe work cease, and 88% said the direction had been effective in resolving the issue. 
 
Turning to strategies for ‘getting things done’, one prominent feature of the approach taken by both 
types of representatives was how they decided what fell within their remit. For example, as in other 
sectors, structural changes to mining work often blur boundaries between traditional OHS matters 
and work organisation issues, like staffing rosters, the pace and intensity of work and shift patterns, 
that can have OHS implications. The ways representatives dealt with such matters reflected the 
labour relations context and their efforts to offset managerial hostility. Their statutory mandate 
explicitly covered traditional OHS matters. Rather than seek a wider understanding of the work 
environment as the basis for their role, as often advocated by unions in others sectors, ISHRs and 
SSHRs sought to maintain a separation of straightforward OHS issues from those less easily defined 
as such. They reported doing this to retain the legitimacy of their position and avoid challenges from 
mining companies. When issues arose that contained ‘OHS’ and other work organisational elements, 
representatives worked on them with the wider union organisation to ensure there was a co-ordinated 
approach where other representatives could deal with ‘industrial’ matters. Regular featuring of OHS 
issues and reports from SSHRs at union lodge meetings were important ways of ensuring such 
integration:  
 
there’s ‘safety’, there’s ‘industrial’. You get pulled into it, you end up getting shot…you’re 
unlucky you’ll probably get bloody prosecuted. So it’s a matter of just reinforcing that  
(7120026 – SSHR) 
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Similarly, experience in a poor industrial relations climate taught representatives that being accused 
of impeding production would lead to swift reprisal from employers. Again, experienced respondents 
indicated they maintained a clear division of task content:  
 
I’m conscious from the point of in my former role like I had the likes of [company] and some 
of the largest multinationals challenge me in particular to that, when I’ve shut their mines 
down, they’re unsafe. And when they had me before the Department Inspectors…each and 
every time there’s nothing to answer…my focus was health and safety. If it was an industrial 
issue, they sort it out there.   
(7120038/9 – Former ISHR) 
 
Representatives, therefore, relied on a prescriptive regulatory mandate when developing strategies 
appropriate to operating as worker representatives in a relatively hostile climate. This allowed them 
to represent the interests of workers on health and safety, despite the hostility of managers. They 
could do so because the wider union organisation prioritised OHS and, through good liaison/co-
ordination with other workplace representatives, they were able to distribute tasks and avoid 
accusation of abusing their position, while ensuring wider issues with indirect OHS implications 
were still addressed. Thus, both ISHRs and SSHRs could identify and remedy a range of conditions, 
which, if left unchecked, would have constituted fatal risks to workers even in mines where the 
labour relations climate was hostile.  
 
Conclusions: framing what works in an unsupportive climate  
  
Overall, our analysis provides evidence that, with the support of fellow workers, their union and the 
mines inspectorate, HSRs in Queensland coalmines address serious risks and these actions are 
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broadly effective. This is despite a hostile labour relations climate and limited support from mining 
companies, whose preferred unitary approach leaves little room for pluralist forms of representative 
participation.  
 
Data on occupational injuries and fatalities for Queensland coalmines over the past 20 years show an 
improving trend, coinciding with the introduction of a systems-focused regulatory regime (Poplin et 
al 2008), but which has slowed in recent years. Limitations of size and access to reliable 
injury/illness data for the mines in our study meant we could not correlate representatives’ actions 
with evidence of outcome trends. However, analysis of documentary evidence, along with qualitative 
interviews, indicates representatives’ actions addressed serious risks and contributed to their 
control/amelioration. Taken together with evidence from quantitative studies elsewhere (see for 
example Boal 2009; Morantz 2011), it supports the conclusion that there is a strong association 
between the actions of union representatives and improved OHS performance, and this occurs 
despite hostile labour relations contexts.  
 
While Gunningham and Sinclair (2012) conclude hostile labour relations lead to mistrust between 
managers and union representatives and this undermines participative engagement in OHSM, stalling 
progress on OHS, we think this interpretation rather misses the point.  Our findings suggest that 
while hostile relations and limited trust between workers and their representatives and managers are 
certainly present, from a pluralist perspective, it is clear that representatives are working within these 
limitations to successfully give voice to their constituents’ OHS interests. Our findings further 
demonstrate that by careful use of their statutory powers, representatives operate effectively in 
identifying and requesting corrections to address fatal risks; reviewing and suggesting modifications 
to OHSM systems where necessary; and very occasionally ordering the stoppage of work in 
situations where consultative approaches have failed or serious and immediate risks are evident.  
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What is actually occurring, therefore, cannot be explained effectively by arguments concerning the 
‘limitations of trust’ on the achievement of effective co-operation in jointly managing OHS. Such 
arguments assume an identity of interest in such situations, which is not supported by workers’ 
experience of their employers, their corporate values or their means of implementing them (Walters 
and Frick 2000, Hall et al 2006). The strategies of representation we have observed are better 
understood as expressions of organised resistance to the experience of unsafe and unhealthy work, 
which corporate strategies to unilaterally impose BBS rules have failed to prevent or control. These 
attempts to dictate workers’ safety behaviour are applied in labour relations contexts in which 
corporate values of production and profit are prioritised while workplace union organisation expends 
considerable efforts protecting workers’ jobs, pay and working conditions. This, coupled with 
workers’ long-term experience of work-related injury, ill-health and death in coalmining, undermines 
any collective faith in unitarist company safety regimes. Where regulated self-regulation is 
interpreted to mean a free hand to impose regimes with little room for autonomous representation of 
workers’ interests, we would argue the absence of trust observed by Gunningham and Sinclair (2012: 
ch 4) is hardly surprising and is not the primary cause of poor implementation of participative 
approaches to OHSM. Rather, it is more correctly identified as one of its consequences.  
 
These findings have wider salience. Ideas about the ‘regulation of self-regulation’ of OHS, in which 
participative approaches to OHS management are embedded, originated at a time when the balance 
of power in labour relations was more evenly distributed. As a result of this growing imbalance, 
there has been a subtle shift in meanings attributed to ‘regulated self-regulation’. Within this shift of 
focus, corporate confidence in its power to overcome resistance from organised labour has acted to 
increasingly control the agenda in which conflict occurs and, in combination with the hegemony of 
pro-business interests within the state and society more generally, to manipulate the meaning of 
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‘participation’ in OHS to one more suited to corporate interests. Notions of ‘safety culture’ are 
synonymous with the organizational culture determined by corporate management. Within such 
approaches BBS systems requiring worker participation in an agenda set by managers have grown in 
popularity over other approaches to managing health and safety. In these systems, there is little place 
for understanding workers’ representatives as a collectivist regime based on workers’ own 
experiences. None of these developments has served to improve labour relations or enhance workers’ 
trust in their managers or the corporate organisations for which they labour.  
 
In such situations, exemplified by the Queensland mines we studied, the strategies adopted by 
workers’ representatives are more appropriately understood as efforts to resist the perceived harmful 
effects of corporate power than they are examples of worker-management co-operation. Our 
evidence indicates that far from being unsustainable, these strategies contribute to ‘getting things 
done’ to improve OHS. This is even more evident when account is taken of the ways representatives 
are careful to remain within the boundaries of the legal definitions of their role and how they work 
with other union representatives to achieve this. We suggest this is a response to the realities of 
workers’ experience. Furthermore, the resurgence of unitary strategies for engaging workers in 
corporate efforts to manage safety is widespread in other sectors. In such scenarios preconditions for 
effectiveness of worker representation identified in previous studies serve more as explanations for 
why things are not happening than to explain what makes things happen in current political and 
economic contexts (Nichols and Walters 2009).  
 
In the coalmines we studied, the actions of representatives offering the strongest possibility for 
protecting workers’ interests were more in line with organised resistance than with notions of trust 
and co-operation. Such approaches may be effective strategies for representation in other sectors too, 
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where the balance of power has shifted markedly in favour of corporate interests and where safety 
management regimes marginalise arrangements for representative participation in OHS.  
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